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On existential declarations of independence in IF
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Fausto Barbero
Abstract
We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between
existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of IF sentences; we give a
syntactical criterion for deciding whether a sentence beginning with such
prefix exists such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the
declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium
semantics values for undetermined IF sentences.
The main theorem allows us to describe the behaviour of various par-
ticular classes of quantifier prefixes, and to prove as a remarkable corollary
that all existential IF sentences are equivalent to first-order sentences.
As a further consequence, we prove that the fragment of IF sentences
with knowledge memory has only first-order expressive power.
Introduction and overview
Independence-Friendly (IF) logic is perhaps, among logics of imperfect infor-
mation that have been introduced so far, the most suitable for expressing the
game theoretical content of semantics (see [5] and [4] for early presentations,
and [9] for a more formal treatment). Its syntax extends common first-order
logic introducing a new slash symbol that allows stating independence between
quantifications; as an example, sentence
∀x∃y∀z(∃w/{x, y})P (x, y, z, w)
is true in the same models as the second-order existential sentence
∃f∃g∀x∀zP (x, f(x), z, g(z))
The intuitive reading of (∃w/{x, y}) is ”there exists a w, independent of x and
y”. We call {x, y} the slash set of w.
As first-order truth in a model can be characterized as the existence of a
winning stategy (for a player that we shall call ∃loise) in a certain semantic game,
the same can be done for the new IF formulas by means of well-crafted games
of imperfect information. Slash sets can be read as instructions for defining
information sets in semantic games; once these have been introduced, the notion
of strategy is restricted to functions that are constant over all information sets.
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It has been observed by Janssen ([8]), however, that IF syntax allows ex-
pressing some declarations of independence which have no effect at all on the
spectrum of truth values of a formula. The standard example is given by the
sentence
∃x(∃y/{x})(x = y) (1)
which seems to assert that two agents may choose the same element from the
domain being each unaware of the other’s choice (an act which should be im-
possible over structures with two elements or more); yet, it is equivalent under
IF semantics to
∃x∃y(x = y)
which is true in all structures.1 What happens is that a winning strategy for
(1) simply consists of two equal constants (0-ary functions). So, the game-
theoretical structure of imperfect information has no effect on the truth values
of (1).
One may be tempted, now, to think that this kind of phenomenon arises
anytime we have a declaration of independence between two existential quanti-
fiers. The experience we have with first-order logic suggests that existentially
quantified variables should never play the role of dependence variables. But it
is known that this is not what happens in IF logic. Consider as an example2
∀x∃y(∃z/{x, y})(x = z). (2)
This formula is undetermined on all structures with at least two elements. In-
stead, if we remove the declaration of independence between the existential
quantifiers, we obtain Hodges’ signalling formula ([6])
∀x∃y(∃z/{x})(x = z)
which is true on all structures. (The value of x may be copied in y, which in
turn can be seen by z. We say that y signals the value of x to z).
As a third example, notice that formulas
∀x(∃y/{x})(∃z/{x, y})(x = z) (3)
and
∀x(∃y/{x})(∃z/{x})(x = z)
are strongly equivalent (they are both undetermined on all structures with at
least two elements). This should subside the suspect that declarations of inde-
pendence may be irrelevant only in existential formulas. What happens, here,
is that the information generated by ∀belard for the universal quantifier is not
accessible to z even by means of signalling.
1We believe that the impossibility of formalizing correctly the intuition that underlies
formula (1) is related to the difficulties that arise when we try to adapt standard notions of
game theory to games of imperfect recall; see section 2 for a brief presentation of this notion.
2As exposed by Allen L.Mann at the Workshop on Dependence and Independence in Logic,
ESSLLI 2010.
2
The main purpose of the present paper will be that of classifying the be-
haviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers; we will
provide a characterization theorem, of a game-theoretical yet syntactical nature,
that will allow us to decide whether a declaration of independence behaves as
in (1) and (3), or instead as in (2).
To be more precise, we will not try to characterize what impact the declara-
tion of independence has on the truth values of a fixed formula; we shall rather
fix a quantifier sequence and investigate whether a sentence can be found which
begins with such quantifier prefix and whose truth values are influenced by re-
moval of the declaration of independence. This further degree of freedom will
be needed in order to choose formulas which inhibit most signalling possibilities.
In section 1 we shall fix a syntax for IF logic and review its game-theoretical
semantics and the game-theoretical terminology related with it. Section 2 re-
views briefly the notions of perfect recall, action recall and knowledge memory,
which will be sometimes referred to, mainly for reasons of analogy. The main
characterization result appears in section 4; some intermediate results, which do
not take in account yet all signalling possibilities, are presented in section 3. In
section 5 some corollaries for particular classes of IF formulas are drawn from
the main theorem. Section 6 extends the main result to the so-called equilib-
rium semantics for IF logic, showing that probabilistic values for undetermined
formulas behave as the main values true and false. In section 7 we generalize
in a different direction, showing that the main result can be applied also to
quantifier sequences which are not prenex. These considerations are not stated
in full generality; rather, they are functional to the proof of the theorem which
is presented in section 8. There we prove that the fragment of IF logic with
knowledge memory has first-order expressive power.
1 IF logic
We mainly refer here to [9], but our syntax slightly differs in that we do not
allow function symbols in our formulas. This will help reduce the complexity of
some proofs. Doing that, we are relying on the hypothesis that adding function
symbols does not increase the expressive power of IF logic. (As far as we know,
the problem has not been addressed in the current literature. We think that the
situation should be analogous to that of first-order logic; but, since properties
of IF logic often happened to defy intuitive considerations, we shall not make
here any incautious guess).
Also, we shall restrict our attention to the so called regular formulas ; this
is justified by the results of [1] which show the strong equivalence of each IF
formula with some regular formula.
Def 1.1. A string ϕ is an IF formula if it satisfies one of the following clauses:
1) ϕ is a first-order atomic formula (without occurrences of function symbols).
2) ϕ is ∼ψ, ψ being a first-order atomic formula (without occurrences of function
symbols).
3) ϕ is ψ ∧ χ or ψ ∨ χ, ψ and χ being IF formulas.
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4) ϕ is (∃v/V )ψ or (∀v/V )ψ, ψ being an IF formula, v being a variable symbol
and V being a finite set of variable symbols ( ”slash set”). We simply write ∃vψ
or ∀vψ when the slash set is empty.
Def 1.2. The set of free variables of an IF formula ϕ, which we call FV (ϕ),
is defined recursively as:
1) FV (R(x1, . . . , xn)) = {x1, . . . , xn}
2) FV (ψ ∧ χ) = FV (ψ ∨ χ) = FV (ψ) ∪ FV (χ)
3) FV ((∃v/V )ψ) = FV ((∀v/V )ψ) = (FV (ψ) \ {v}) ∪ V .
Def 1.3. An IF sentence is an IF formula ϕ such that FV (ϕ) = ∅.
Sets Subf(ϕ) of subformulas are defined as usual.
Def 1.4. An IF formula ϕ is regular if the following hold: 1) If a quantification
(Qv/V ) occurs in ϕ, and x ∈ V , then (Qv/V ) is subordinated to (i.e., it occurs
within the syntactical scope of) another quantification, which is of the form
(Q′x/X)
2) If a quantification (Qv/V ) occurs in ϕ, then it is not subordinated to any
quantification of the form (Qv/W ).
Convention 1.5. Everywhere in the present paper, we shall suppose that each
variable is quantified only once in the formulas and in the quantifier prefixes
we are speaking about. This is justified by the result, proved in [1] that each IF
formula is strongly equivalent (see below) to a regular formula, together with the
fact that we are dealing mainly with prenex formulas.
We introduce now the game-theoretical semantics of IF sentences. Sensible
semantics can be defined also for IF formulas (see [6] and [7], or also [9]), but
we will not need it here.
We associate to each IF formula ϕ, each assignment s such that dom(s) ⊇
FV (ϕ) and each suitable structure M a game G(ϕ, s,M) of imperfect informa-
tion (in case s = ∅, we may simply write G(ϕ,M)). Such game is defined by its
set of players, by its rules and by its information sets. We will also introduce
some extra terminology, which, although somewhat redundant, will allow us to
speak more easily about the games.
Def 1.6. The set of players of G(ϕ, s,M) is N = {∃loise, ∀belard}. The fol-
lowing clauses are the rules of G(ϕ, s,M):
1. At the beginning of the game, ∃loise plays as a Verifier, ∀belard plays as
a Falsifier.
2. If ϕ is an atomic formula or a negated atomic formula, then the game ends,
and, if ϕ is true in M , then the Verifier wins; otherwise, the Falsifier wins.
3. If ϕ = ψ ∧ χ, then the Falsifier chooses one out of ψ and χ, and game
G(ψ, s,M) (resp., G(χ, s,M)) is played.
4. If ϕ = ψ ∨ χ, then the Verifier chooses one out of ψ and χ, and game
G(ψ, s,M) (resp., G(χ, s,M)) is played.
4
5. If ϕ = (∀v/V )ψ, then the Falsifier chooses an element c of M , and game
G(ψ, s(c/v),M) is played.
6. If ϕ = (∃v/V )ψ, then the Verifier chooses an element c of M , and game
G(ψ, s(c/v),M) is played.
Def 1.7. We can define more formally the structure of the game by defining
its histories and the associated assignments. The set H = ∪{Hψ|ψ ∈
Subf(ϕ)} is defined inductively.
1) (s, ϕ) ∈ Hϕ.
2) If ψ ◦ χ ∈ Subf(ϕ), then Hψ◦χ = {h⌢ψ|h ∈ Hψ} ∪ {h⌢χ|h ∈ Hχ} (where ◦
is either ∧ or ∨).
3) If (Qv/V )ψ ∈ Subf(ϕ), then H(Qv/V )ψ = {h
⌢(v,m)⌢ψ|h ∈ Hψ ,m ∈ M}
(Q being a quantifier).
For each history h ∈ H we define the associated assignment sh as:
sh =


s if h = (s, ϕ)
sh′ if h = h
′⌢ψ
sh′(v/a) if h = h
′⌢(v, a)
As usual in game theory, each history may identified with a node of a game
tree. Histories which end with an atomic formula or a negation of an atomic
formula are called terminal histories, or plays.
Def 1.8. Two histories h, h′ are in the same information set, and we write
h ∼ h′, if either holds:
1) h and h′ are the same history
2) h, h′ ∈ H(Qv/V )ψ and sh, sh′ only differ on variables of V .
Having defined the games, now we can define the semantics of IF logic.
Def 1.9. For each history h we define
P (h) =
{
∃loise if h ∈ Hψ∨χ or h ∈ H(∃v/V )ψ
∀belard if h ∈ Hψ∧χ or h ∈ H(∀v/V )ψ
(for some ψ, χ) and we set H∃ = {h ∈ H |P (h) = ∃loise} and H∀ = {h ∈
H |P (h) = ∀belard}.
A (pure) strategy for ∃loise is a set of functions fh, one for each h ∈ H∃,
such that:
1) dom(fh) = dom(sh).
2) In case h ∈ Hψ∨χ, fh(~x) = ψ or fh(~x) = χ.
3) In case h ∈ H(∃v/V )ψ, then fh(~x) ∈M , and h ∼ h
′ implies fh(~x) = fh′(~x).
Strategies for ∀belard are defined analogously.
A (pure strategy) profile for an IF game is a couple (σ, τ) consisting of a
strategy for ∃loise and one for ∀belard.
Notice that each profile uniquely determines a play of the game, call it zστ .
Given a terminal history h, let Ah be the last component of h (i.e., the atomic
or negated atomic formula on which the play ends).
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Def 1.10. The utility function for player P is defined as:
u∃(h) =
{
1 ifM |= Ah
0 ifM 6|= Ah
u∀(h) = 1− u∃(h).
We say that a strategy σ is winning for ∃loise if for any strategy τ of ∀belard
we have u∃(zστ ) = 1.
We define analogously winning strategies for ∀belard.
Def 1.11. (Truth values) An IF sentence ϕ is true in M if ∃loise has a
winning strategy for G(ϕ, ∅,M).
It is false in M if ∀belard has a winning strategy for G(ϕ, ∅,M).
Otherwise, we say that ϕ is undetermined in M.
Def 1.12. We say that two IF sentences ϕ, ϕ′ are truth (resp. falsity) equiv-
alent, and we write ϕ ≡ ϕ′, if they are true (resp. false) in the same structures.
We say ϕ and ϕ′ are strongly equivalent, and we write ϕ ≡∗ ϕ′, if they are
both truth and falsity equivalent.
2 A few words on game-theoretical structure
Now that we have associated an extensive game to each sentence and structure,
we can look at the properties of such games. It turns out that some of these
properties can be associated to the formula only, without reference to the par-
ticular structure under consideration; in some cases, they may be characterized
by syntactical properties of the formula. A notable example is the property of
perfect recall, which expresses the fact that a player never forgets his previous
actions and knowledge. A game has perfect recall iff both of the following hold:
• Action recall: The player does not forget his own moves.
• Knowledge memory: The player does not forget his previous knowl-
edge.
It turns out that these two concepts are characterizable synctactically ([11]); for
IF formulas in negation normal form,
• ∃loise has action recall in G(ϕ,M) iff in ϕ there are no declarations of
independence between existential quantifiers.
• ∃loise has knowledge memory in G(ϕ,M) iff
1) for every triple of existential quantifications that occur in ϕ, say (∃v/V )
superordinated to (∃w/W ) superordinated to (∃z/Z), v ∈ Z implies v ∈
W , and
2) if a disjunction ∨i occurs superordinated to (∃z/Z), then v ∈ Z implies
that v is not quantified superordinated to ∨i.
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(Clumsier characterizations can be given for generic IF formulas).
Thus, perfect recall itself is characterizable by synctactical means. So, we can
speak of ”formulas of perfect recall”. It turned out that IF formulas are quite
essentially formulas of imperfect recall, meaning that all IF formulas of perfect
recall are truth equivalent to some first-order formula, and also falsity equivalent
to some (possibly different) first-order formula (see [11] or [9] for a proof).
3 Towards a game-theoretical characterization
Here we consider a weak notion of relevance of declarations of independence.
Def 3.1. Given a formula ϕ with a single occurrence of a quantifier (∃y/ . . . x
. . . ), we denote as ϕy←x the formula obtained from ϕ by removing the declara-
tion of independence from x. (In the present paper we are only interested in the
case that x occurs in an existential superordinated quantification).
Def 3.2. A declaration of independence in an existential quantifier from an
existential quantifier (I∃∃) occurring in a quantifier prefix ~Q is relevant if
there exist a sentence ϕ = ~Qψ, and a structure M , such that ϕ and ϕy←x have
different truth values on M . Otherwise, it is said to be irrelevant.
Clearly, any formula containing an I∃∃ lacks action recall. We claim that
relevance of the I∃∃ is tightly connected to the structure of knowledge memory
of the formula.
A remark: we focus on this case, and not on declarations of indipendence of
existential quantifiers from universal quantifiers (I∀∃) because the latter have
trivial behaviour in this context. Indeed, formula
. . . (∀x/X) . . . (∃y/Y ) . . . (x1 = 0 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = 0 ∧ x = y)
(where x ∈ Y and the xis are all the existential variables occurring in the
quantifier prefix) is not true, while
. . . (∀x/X) . . . (∃y/(Y \ {x})) . . . (x1 = 0 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = 0 ∧ x = y)
is. Declaration types I∃∀ and I∀∀ may be treated dually.
In the present paragraph, we will define two conditions related to knowledge
memory that will be proved to be, respectively, a sufficient and a necessary
condition for relevance. This will help the reader to get acquainted, in a simpler
context, with some proof methods that will be applied in the next paragraph
in order to prove a characterization result. This is our candidate as a sufficient
condition:
Def 3.3. We say that an I∃∃ (say (∃y/Y ), subordinated to (∃x/X) and such
that x ∈ Y ), occurring in a formula ϕ breaks knowledge memory if there is a
universally quantified variable v, superordinated to (∃x/X), such that v ∈ Y \X.
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Clearly, if an I∃∃ breaks knowledge memory for a certain prenex formula φ
of quantifier prefix ~Q, it breaks knowledge memory for any other prenex for-
mula with the same quantifier prefix; we may say, thus, that it breaks knowledge
memory in ~Q.
Notice also that this is a more specific notion than ”lacking knowledge mem-
ory”; here we make reference to a specific superordinate quantifier ∃x.
Furthermore, specific reference to universal quantifications is needed because it
is only at universal quantifications that information is generated that could hap-
pen not be available to ∃loise (this intuitive claim is proved in the present paper
for any quantifier prefix; of course it does not hold if we also have connectives
superordinated to quantifiers). If we only requested that Y 6⊂ X , there would
be purely existential formulas whose quantifiers break knowledge memory and
yet are not relevant. Such an example is Janssen’s formula (1). However, we
give a name to such a condition for later usage:
Def 3.4. We say that an I∃∃ (say (∃y/Y ), subordinated to (∃x/X) and such
that x ∈ Y ), occurring in a formula ϕ weakly breaks knowledge memory if
there is a variable v, superordinated to (∃x/X), such that v ∈ Y \X.
Now we state and prove the sufficient condition for relevance.
Theorem 3.5. If an I∃∃ occurring in a quantifier prefix ~Q breaks knowledge
memory in ~Q, then it is relevant in ~Q.
Proof. Suppose the prefix ~Q is of the form . . . (∃x/X) . . . (∃y/Y ) . . . , where
x ∈ Y . Now fix a universally quantified variable v ∈ Y \X which occurs super-
ordinated to (∃x/X). There is at least one because our I∃∃ breaks knowledge
memory. Denote the remaining existentially quantified variables as x1, . . . , xn.
Let W be the set of all variables occurring in ~Q; let w be a new variable. Define
a sentence3
ϕ = ~Q(∃w/W )(v = y ∧ x1 = w ∧ · · · ∧ xn = w),
Let |M | be a set containing at least two distinct elements. Let M be any
structure with domain |M |.
We prove that there is no winning strategy for ∃loise in G(ϕ,M). Suppose
σ is a winning strategy.
Let h be a terminal history that can be played as ∃loise plays according to σ
(remember that, once a strategy for ∃loise is fixed, the actual play is determined
by ∀belard’s moves only). Suppose that in h, for some i, different objects are
chosen for xi and for w. Then, there is another terminal history h
′ that differs
from h at most in that ∀belard chooses ”xi = w” as a last move. Since this
history is also playable as ∃loise plays according to her supposedly winning
strategy σ, and in it ∀belard wins, we have a contradiction.
3Notice that this sentence imposes no constraints on universally quantified variables except
for v. So, it cannot happen that ∀belard is forced to signal the value of v through these
variables.
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Suppose now that, in h, the same value is chosen for all x1, . . . , xn and w.
Then, there is another terminal history g that can be played as ∃loise plays
according to σ and which differs from h at most in that ∀belard, as a last move,
chooses the leftmost conjunct v = y.
Suppose that ∀belard’s choice for v in g is some element e. Since there
are at least two distinct elements in |M |, there is another terminal history g′,
playable according to σ, in which ∀belard’s moves differ only in that he chooses
something else for v (say e′ 6= e). It may happen that, as a consequence, now
σ prescribes different choices for w and for some xi; if that happens, we are
again in the former case, and we obtain a contradiction. Suppose instead that
σ prescribes the same choices for all w, x1, . . . , xn also in g
′. Let A be the node
of choice for y which is reached in g, and let B be node of choice for y which
is reached in g′. A and B are in the same information state, since the histories
which end with them differ only in the choice for v ∈ Y . So, σ prescribes the
same move in both A and B. But there is no choice for y that leads to a victory
for ∃loise in both g and g′. So, σ is not a winning strategy.
Instead, there is at least one winning strategy for ∃loise in G(ϕy←x,M): for
variable x, choose the same value that ∀belard has chosen for variable v. This
is allowed because x depends on v.
Choose for y the same value that was chosen for x; this is allowed because
y depends on x.
Choose the same fixed value for all variables x1, . . . , xn, w.
The reader may have noticed that the proof procedure dictates only very
generic requirements concerning the construction procedure for the model; it is
only asked that the domain contains at least two elements. We will discuss this
point in the next section (corollary 4.4).
Here we add a necessary condition for relevance. The result is not so interest-
ing in itself, but it suggests what we should do in order to find a characterization
of relevance; the proof illustrates how signalling works in simple cases.
Theorem 3.6. If an I∃∃ occurring in a quantifier prefix ~Q is relevant in ~Q,
then it weakly breaks knowledge memory in ~Q.
Proof. Suppose that the I∃∃ does not weakly break knowledge memory. Sup-
pose ϕ is a sentence beginning with prefix ~Q, and suppose we have a win-
ning strategy for ∃loise in ϕy←x; in it, ∃loise chooses x according to a func-
tion fx(u1, . . . , us) and y according to a function fy(v1, . . . vt, x) such that
{u1, . . . , us} ⊂ {v1, . . . vt}. This inclusion holds because the I∃∃ does not
weakly break knowledge memory. We may turn σ into a winning strategy for
ϕ by choosing y according to a strategy function gy(v1, . . . , vt) defined using
the (permitted) value of fx(u1, . . . , us) anywhere x occurred in the definition of
fy(v1, . . . , vt, x).
Other cases:
- Suppose ∃loise has no winning strategy for ϕy←x; then she cannot have one
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for ϕ, whose game is harder to win due to lack of information.
-Suppose ∀belard has a winning strategy for ϕy←x; then, this is also winning
for ϕ, because slashes in existential quantifications play no role for ∀belard
-Suppose ∀belard has no winning strategies for ϕy←x: then, for the same reason,
he has none for ϕ.
4 The characterization result
We have seen that (Theorem 3.6) if an existential declaration of independence of
y from x is relevant, then there must be some information which is available to
the verifier in x but is explicitly hidden to the verifier in y. Also, it seems likely
that the information we are speaking about is generated by ∀belard’s moves, i.e.
by the choice made for some universal quantification. Lemma 3.5 agrees with
this observation. All of this suggests a generalization of the notions introduced
in the previous paragraph.
Def 4.1. Given two quantifications (Qv/V ) and (Q′v′/V ′) occurring in a quan-
tifier prefix ~P , we write
(Qv/V ) ≺ (Q′v′/V ′)
in order to say that (Qv/V ) is superordinated to (Q′v′/V ) in ~P .
Def 4.2. A sequence
((∀vk/Vk), (∃vk−1/Vk−1), . . . , (∃v1/V1), (∃x/X), (∃y/Y ))
of quantifications is a broken signalling sequence if the following conditions
hold:
1) x ∈ Y
2) (∀vk/Vk) ≺ (∃vk−1/Vk−1) ≺ · · · ≺ (∃v1/V1) ≺ (∃x/X) ≺ (∃y/Y )
3) v1 /∈ X and vi /∈ Vi−1, for all i = 2..k
4) v1, . . . , vk ∈ Y
In case k = 1, we always request that vk is universally quantified.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose there is an I∃∃ of the form (∃y/ . . . x . . . ) occurring in
a quantifier prefix ~Q. Let Y be be a name for the slash set of y. Then, the I∃∃
is relevant if and only if ~Q contains a broken signalling sequence of the form
((∀vk/Vk), (∃vk−1/Vk−1), . . . , (∃v1/V1), (∃x/X), (∃y/Y )).
Proof. ⇐=) This proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.5; variable vk plays
the same role that was played before by variable v. We just explain what
modifications should be made. Fix a broken signalling sequence in ~Q. Let
x1, . . . , xn be the remaining existentially quantified variables of ~Q, i.e., those
that are different from vk−1, . . . , v1, x, y; let W be as before. Let ϕ be:
ϕ = ~Q(∃w/W )(vk = y ∧ x1 = w ∧ · · · ∧ xn = w).
The model M is defined as before, as any structure whose domain contains at
least two elements.
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From the hypothesis that ∃loise has a winning strategy for G(ϕ,M) we get
a contradiction as in the proof of Theorem 3.5. The contradiction derives from
conditions 1 and 4. Indeed, define h, g, A and B similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 3.5. The only difference is that we cannot guarantee the existence
of a g that differs from h only for what regards the choice of a value for vk.
Changing the value of vk will make so that strategy σ will assign new values
to vk−1, . . . , v1. But, also in this case, conditions 1 and 4 guarantee that σ
prescribes the same move for both A and B. So we get the contradiction as
before.
∃loise has a winning strategy for G(ϕy←x,M). We describe it.
For i = 1..k − 1 choose for variable vi the same value that was chosen for
variable vi+1. This is allowed by condition 3 in the definition of broken signalling
sequence.
For variable x, choose the same value that was chosen for v1. Again, we are
relying on condition 3.
For y, choose the same value that was chosen for x.
Choose one and the same value for x1, . . . , xn, w.
=⇒) Suppose that in ~Q there are no broken signalling sequences ending
with (∃x/X), (∃y/Y ). Let ϕ be a sentence which begins with prefix ~Q, and M
a structure.
As a first case, suppose that ∃loise has a winning strategy σ for G(ϕy←x,M).
We want to produce a winning strategy for ∃loise in G(ϕ,M). We will do so
through an iterative process of elimination of forbidden variables. In order to
keep track of what happens during this process, we shall make use of an indexed
notation for denoting variables. The index will be a sequence of numbers. For
example, variable u(n1,...nl) will be the variable that is met during the l-th
stage of the iterative process; to be more precise, it will be the nlth among
the existentially quantified variables which are associated to variable u(n1,...nl−1)
(which has been, in turn, generated during the nl−1th stage, and so on). Instead,
variable z(n1,...nl) is a universally quantified variable which is met during the l-
th stage of the iterative process, and, as u(n1,...nl), is associated to variable
u(n1,...nl−1).
Now, strategy σ chooses x according to a function fx(u(1), . . . , u(m), z(1),
. . . , z(n)), where u(1), . . . , u(m) are existentially quantified variables, and z(1),
. . . , z(n) are universally quantified variables. And it chooses y according to
some function fy(v1, . . . , vt, x). We want to replace the reference to x with a
functional expression which contains, as variables, only variables which are not
in Y , i.e. variables that are visible for y in ϕ.
As a stage 0, replace x in fy(v1, . . . , vt, x) with fx(u(1), . . . , u(m), z(1), . . . , z(n));
call t0 the object thus obtained.
As stage 1, let C1 be the set of variables u(i) such that either (A) u(i) does
not depend on any existentially quantified variable or (B) u(i) /∈ Y ; in case (B)
does not hold, replace such variables in t0 with expressions fu(i)(z(i,1), z(i,2), . . . )
(in which the list of arguments could also be empty) where fu(i) is the func-
tion which σ assigns to variable u(i). Let, also, D1 be the set of variables
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u(i) which are not in C1. These ones are to be replaced in t0 by expressions
fu(i)(u(i,1), u(i,2), . . . , z(i,1), z(i,2), . . . ), as established by σ. The final result of
these substitutions will be an expression t1.
At stage 2, let C2 := {u(i,j)|u(i) ∈ D1 and u(i,j) satisfies either (A) or (B)} and
D2 := {u(i,j)|u(i) ∈ D1 and u(i,j) /∈ C2}. Perform in t1 analogous substitutions
as those that were made at stage 1.
The generic n-th stage is performed analogously to stage 2. The process ends as
soon as some Dr is empty. The correspondent expression tr−1 will be a nested
application of functions; the only unnested objects occurring in it will be nullary
functions (which correspond to existentially quantified variables of some Ci) and
variables.
Now, ∃loise is allowed to use any of her strategy functions in order to define a
strategy function for choosing y; furthermore, the existentially quantified vari-
ables that are left in tr−1 are those that satisfy (B), so they are accessible for
y. We want to show that ∃loise is also allowed to use any of the universally
quantified variables occurring in tr−1. If we manage to do so, we will be able to
define a winning strategy for ∃loise in G(ϕ,M) just by replacing, in σ, function
fy with the function defined by the expression tr−1, and so our theorem will be
proved.
So, suppose that some universally quantified variable z(n1,...,ns) occurring in
tr−1 is not accessible to y, i.e. suppose that z(n1,...,ns) ∈ Y . We will show that,
then, the sequence ~S = ((∀z(n1,...,ns)/Z(n1,...,ns)), (∃u(n1,...,ns−1)/U(n1,...,ns−1)),
. . . , (∃u(n1)/U(n1)), (∃x/X), (∃y/Y )) is a broken signalling sequence: a contra-
diction.
Observe that u(n1,...,ns−1) does not satisfy (B), i.e., it holds that u(n1,...,ns−1) ∈
Y . Analogously, we can prove that u(n1,...,ns−2), . . . , u(n1,n2), u(n1) ∈ Y . So,
~S satisfies condition 4 of the definition of broken signalling sequence. We also
assumed that x ∈ Y : so, condition 1 is satisfied. Conditions 2 and 3 are trivially
satisfied by construction.
This reasoning accounts for the case in which ∃loise has a winning strategy for
G(ϕy←x,M). The remaining cases are dealt with as in the proof of theorem
3.6.
Since the proof of the right-to-left implication defines a very generic model,
we may strenghten the consequences of there being a broken signalling sequence:
Corollary 4.4. Let ~Q be a quantifier prefix. Suppose it contains a broken sig-
nalling sequence ((∀vk/Vk), (∃vk−1/Vk−1), . . . , (∃v1/V1), (∃x/X), (∃y/Y )). Then,
there is an IF sentence ϕ = ~Qψ such that, for all structures M containing at
least two elements, ϕy←x is true in M , while ϕ is not.
5 Some consequences
We can see that the main theorem has immediate consequences for simpler
classes of sentences.
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Corollary 5.1. Let ϕ be a prenex existential IF sentence. We may remove or
add any superordinated variable in the slash sets of ϕ, obtaining still a strongly
equivalent formula.
Proof. Let ϕ′ be obtained from ϕ by adding to each slash set all of its super-
ordinated variables. Since there are only existential quantifiers in ϕ′, all of its
declarations of independence are I∃∃s. And, since there are no universal quan-
tifiers occurring in ϕ′, its quantifier prefix cannot contain any broken signalling
sequence. So, no declaration of independence in ϕ′ is relevant. Thus, they may
be removed from slash sets without changing the truth value of the formula. So,
all of the formulas that can be obtained from ϕ′ by removing some declarations
of independence (including, thus, ϕ) are strongly equivalent.
This implies, in particular:
Corollary 5.2. Every prenex existential IF sentence is strongly equivalent to a
first-order sentence.
Proof. Just remove all declarations of independence from the sentence; the re-
sulting formula will be strongly equivalent (by 5.1) and will have first-order
syntax. It will also be true in the same models in IF semantics as in first-order
semantics, since IF logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic; it will
be false in the same models because first-order formulas satisfy the excluded
middle principle.
(this fact can be given a much simpler proof if we make use of Hodges’
compositional semantics, as is suggested in [2]).
More generally, by similar arguments we can prove:
Corollary 5.3. Let ~Q be a quantifier prefix which contains only existential
quantifications. Let ~Qψ be an IF sentence. Let ~Q′ be obtained from ~Q by
removing or adding arbitrary superordinated variables from the slash sets. Then,
~Qψ ≡∗ ~Q′ψ
In particular, if ψ is a first-order formula, then ~Qψ is strongly equivalent to a
first-order sentence.
As a last generalization,
Corollary 5.4. Let ~Q be a quantifier prefix of the form ∃∀∃1 (i.e. a sequence
of existential quantifications, followed by a sequence of universal quantifications,
followed by one single occurrence of an existential quantification). Let ~Qψ be
an IF sentence. Let ~Q′ be obtained from ~Q by removing or adding arbitrary
superordinated variables from the slash sets of existential quantifiers. Then,
~Qψ ≡∗ ~Q′ψ
In particular, if ψ is a first-order formula, then ~Qψ is truth equivalent to a
first-order sentence.
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This last result only guarantees truth-equivalence: our main theorem does
not allow us to remove declarations of independence from universally quantified
variables.
Besides classifying quantifier prefixes according to the kind of quantifications
involved, we can look instead at the kind of independence sets that appear in
them. From this point of view, we also have that4:
Corollary 5.5. Let ~Q be a quantifier prefix whose independence sets contain
only existentially quantified variables. Let ~Qψ be an IF sentence. Let ~Q′ be ob-
tained from ~Q by removing arbitrarily variables from the slash sets of existential
quantifiers, or also adding them existentially quantified variables. Then,
~Qψ ≡∗ ~Q′ψ
In particular, if ψ is a quantifier-free formula, then ~Qψ is strongly equivalent to
a first-order formula.
Proof. Any broken signalling sequence contains at least one declaration of in-
dependence from a universally quantified variable (what we called vk). So our
quantifier prefix does not contain any broken signalling sequence, and we may
apply Theorem 4.3.
6 Relevance and equilibrium semantics
Our main theorem 4.3 regards only the canonical truth values true, false, unde-
termined. But, IF semantics can also be extended to the so-called equilibrium
semantics, which assigns a sort of probabilistic values to undetermined formulas,
thus providing a finer grain classification of IF sentences (equilibrium semantics
were introduced in [11] and then developed in [10] and [9]). We will briefly re-
view these notions and then show that the new values behave like the canonical
truth calues as regards relevance.
Def 6.1. A mixed strategy for player P is a probability distribution over
the set of strategies of P . A (mixed strategy) profile for an IF game is a
couple (µ, ν) consisting of a mixed strategy for ∃loise and one for ∀belard. The
expected utility for player P and profile (µ, ν) is defined as
UP (µ, ν) =
∑
(σ,τ)∈Pr
µ(σ)ν(τ)uP (zστ )
where we denote as Pr the set of pure strategy profiles for the game under
consideration.
Def 6.2. An equilibrium for a game G(ϕ, s,M) is a mixed strategy profile
(µ, ν) such that, for every mixed strategy ζ of ∃loise, and for every mixed strategy
ξ of ∀belard
U∃(ζ, ν) ≤ U∃(µ, ν)
4The following corollary was suggested by Allen L. Mann, personal communication.
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U∀(µ, ξ) ≤ U∀(µ, ν)
(i.e., no player can improve his expected utility by means of unilateral deviation).
Since IF games are constant sum games (u∃(h) + u∀(h) = 1 for all terminal
histories), we can rewrite the conditions for equilibrium as:
U∃(ζ, ν) ≤ U∃(µ, ν) ≤ U∃(µ, ξ).
The fact that the game is constant sum also implies that U∃(µ, ν) = U∃(µ
′, ν′)
for any pair of equilibria (µ, ν), (µ′, ν′); this justifies the following definition.
Def 6.3. Let ϕ be an IF sentence, M a structure. Suppose G(ϕ, ∅,M) has an
equilibrium (µ, ν). Then we define the value of the sentence on M as v(ϕ,M) =
U∃(µ, ν).
Theorem 6.4. ([11]) An IF sentence ϕ is true on M iff v(ϕ,M) = 1; it is
false iff v(ϕ,M) = 0.
So, we can say that these values define an extension of IF semantics (”equilib-
rium semantics”). Undetermined formulas receive values from the open interval
(0, 1).
Def 6.5. An I∃∃ occurring in a quantifier prefix ~Q is ǫ-relevant if there exist a
sentence ϕ = ~Qψ, and a structure M , such that either v(ϕ,M) 6= v(ϕy←x,M),
or one of the values is defined and the other is not.
Clearly, relevance implies ǫ-relevance. The opposite implication, which is
not quite obvious, follows from the next theorem.
Theorem 6.6. Suppose there is an I∃∃ of the form (∃y/ . . . x . . . ) occurring in
a quantifier prefix ~Q. Let Y be be a name for the slash set of y. Then, the I∃∃
is ǫ-relevant if and only if ~Q contains a broken signalling sequence of the form
((∀vk/Vk), (∃vk−1/Vk−1), . . . , (∃v1/V1), (∃x/X), (∃y/Y )).
Proof. ⇐=) The hypothesis implies relevance, by Theorem 4.3, and thus ǫ-
relevance.
=⇒) We shall refer, in what follows, to the utility function for player P in
the game G(ϕy←x,M) as u1P ; for game G(ϕ,M), we write u
2
P . We follow an
analogous convention for expected utilities.
Suppose that in ~Q there are no broken signalling sequences ending with
((∃x/X), (∃y/Y )). Thanks to this hypothesis, we are able, by means of the
procedure described in the proof of Theorem 4.3, to associate to any strategy
function f for y from a game G(ϕy←x,M) a term tf which defines f refer-
ring only to variables which are not in Y . Then, to any pure strategy p for
∃loise in G(ϕy←x,M) we may associate another pure strategy p′ by replac-
ing the choice function for y with its associate term. This is a correct defini-
tion of a strategy for G(ϕ,M). Notice 1) that u2
∃
(p′, q) = u1
∃
(p, q) against any
strategy q, and 2) that the operator ’ is surjective on the set of strategies for
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G(ϕ,M) (indeed, Strat(ϕ,M) ⊆ Strat(ϕy←x,M), and the operator fixes all
strategies in Strat(ϕ,M) – the procedure never removes variables which are
not in Y ). To any mixed strategy σ for ∃loise in G(ϕy←x,M) we now asso-
ciate a mixed strategy σ′ for G(ϕ,M) defined as σ′(p′) =
∑
q∈Ξp′
σ(q), where
Ξp′ = {q ∈ Strat(ϕy←x,M)|q′ = p′} (clearly, σ′ is well-defined). Again we have,
for expected utilities, that EU2
∃
(σ′, τ) = EU1
∃
(σ, τ) against any τ .
Now, suppose ϕ and ϕy←x are both undetermined in a structure M (the
other cases are already taken care of by Theorem 4.3). To any strategy pro-
file (σ, τ) for G(ϕy←x,M) we associate a profile (σ′, τ) for G(ϕ,M) as de-
scribed above. We want to calculate the expected utilities for each player
ρ. Let us now define S = {(p, q)|(p, q) is a strategy profile for G(ϕ,M)} and
X = {(p, q)|(p, q) is a strategy profile for G(ϕy←x,M)}. We have:
EU2ρ (σ
′, τ) =
∑
(p,q)∈S
σ′(p)τ(q)u2ρ(p, q)
=
∑
(p,q)∈S



∑
r∈Ξp
σ(r)

 τ(q)u2ρ(p, q)


=
∑
(p,q)∈S
∑
r∈Ξp
σ(r)τ(q)u1ρ(r, q)
=
∑
(r,q)∈X
σ(r)τ(q)u1ρ(r, q)
= EU1ρ (σ, τ)
In the second line we used the definition of σ′. In the third line we used dis-
tributivity, together with the fact that u2ρ(p, q) = u
1
ρ(r, q).
Now, since the main equality holds for any profile (σ, τ) of game G(ϕy←x,M),
and Strat(ϕ,M) ⊆ Strat(ϕy←x,M), we get that if (σ, τ) in an equilibrium for
ϕy←x, then (σ′, τ) is an equilibrium for ϕ with the same value. Suppose in-
deed there is a strategy τ∗ for ∀belard such that EU2
∃
(σ′, τ∗) < EU2
∃
(σ′, τ).
Then, by the equality, EU1
∃
(σ, τ∗) < EU1
∃
(σ, τ), contradicting the fact that
(σ, τ) is an equilibrium of G(ϕy←x,M). Analogously (using also Strat(ϕ,M) ⊆
Strat(ϕy←x,M)) we can prove that inequalities of the form EU2
∃
(σ∗, τ) >
EU2
∃
(σ′, τ) cannot hold.
We want to prove, now, that any equilibrium (σ, τ) for G(ϕ,M) is also
an equilibrium for G(ϕy←x,M). Suppose instead that there is some strategy
σ∗ for ∃loise in G(ϕy←x,M) such that EU1
∃
(σ∗, τ) > EU1
∃
(σ, τ). So, thanks
again to the main equality, and since σ′ = σ (because operator ’ fixes strategies
of G(ϕ,M)) we have that EU2
∃
((σ∗)′, τ) > EU2
∃
(σ, τ), contradicting the fact
that (σ, τ) is an equilibrium for G(ϕ,M). Analogously one can prove that
EU1
∃
(σ, τ∗) < EU1
∃
(σ, τ) cannot hold for any τ∗.
Corollary 6.7. An I∃∃ occurring in a quantifier prefix ~Q is relevant if and
only if it is ǫ-relevant.
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This means that if we have a structure M and an IF formula ψ such that
0 < v( ~Qψ,M), v(( ~Qψ)y←x,M) < 1 (both formulas are undetermined) and
v( ~Qψ,M) 6= v(( ~Qψ)y←x,M), then there are also N,χ such that v( ~Qχ,N) 6=
6= v(( ~Qχ)y←x, N) but at least one out of and ~Qχ and ( ~Qχ)y←x is determined.
Corollaries analogue to those of section 5 do hold.
7 Non-prenex quantifier sequences
The results of the previous sections were proved only for prenex sequences of
quantifiers. We show here that some generalization is possible. We will need
these generalized results in the following section, where we shall study the ex-
pressive power of a fragment of IF logic which is not closed with respect to the
usual prenex transformations.
Def 7.1. The syntactical tree of an IF formula ϕ is the set of quantifiers,
connectives, and atomic subformulas of ϕ, ordered according to superordination.
Def 7.2. An positive initial syntactical tree is a finite tree whose elements
are either (occurrences of) conjunctions, disjunctions or quantifiers (with their
slash sets), and which respects the following constraints:
1) each connective has exactly two successors
2) each quantifier has exactly one successor.
The word positive refers to the fact that we do not allow negation symbols
to occur.
Def 7.3. A dense open subset Y of a tree T is Y ⊂ T such that
∀y ∈ Y ∀t ∈ T (t  y → t ∈ Y )
Def 7.4. An IF formula ϕ begins with T if T is a tree and a dense open subset
of the syntactical tree of ϕ.
Def 7.5. We say that a I∃∃ declaration of independence (say, independence of
y from x) occurs in a tree T if {(∃x/X), (∃y/Y )} ⊂ T , (∃x/X) ≺ (∃y/Y ) and
x ∈ Y .
We say it is t-relevant in T if there exist a sentence ϕ beginning with T , and
a structure M , such that ϕ and ϕy←x have different truth values on M .
Def 7.6. A (generalized) broken signalling sequence occurring in a posi-
tive initial tree T is a linearly ordered subset of T consisting of quantifiers only
and satisfying conditions 1-2-3-4 of definition 4.2.
The reader who is acquainted with fenomena of signalling in IF logic may
be surprised to see that disjunction symbols are not going to play a role in this
generalized notion. The proof of the following result should clarify this point.
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Theorem 7.7. Suppose T is a positive initial tree with an I∃∃ declaration of
independence of y from x. Then, the I∃∃ is t-relevant if and only if T contains a
generalized broken signalling sequence of the form ((∀vk/Vk), (∃vk−1/Vk−1), . . . ,
(∃v1/V1), (∃x/X), (∃y/Y )).
Proof. ⇐=) We define ϕ by extending T to a syntactical tree; this is achieved
by extending each maximal chain (linearly ordered subset) K of T with the
synctactical tree of some IF formula. If Kˆ is the chain which contains the I∃∃,
then extend it with the syntactical tree of formula (∃w/W )(vk = y ∧ x1 =
w∧· · ·∧xn = w), W being the set of all variables occurring in Kˆ. For any other
maximal chain K, let c be the maximal element of K ∩ Kˆ. If c is a disjunc-
tion, extend K with the synctactical tree of a contradiction (e.g. ∃uk(uk 6= uk),
where uk is a new variable); if c is a conjunction, extend K with a validity (e.g.
∃uh(uh = uh)).
Then the proof follows the sames lines as the proof of the right-to-left part of
Theorem 4.3 (keeping in mind that any choice at disjunctions which leads out-
side of Kˆ is a loss for ∃loise, and any choice at conjunctions which leads outside
of Kˆ is a loss for ∀belard).
=⇒) The proof is completely analogous to that of the left-to-right part of the-
orem 4.3.
8 On the fragment of knowledge memory
We described in section 2 the game-theoretical notions of perfect recall, knowl-
edge memory and action recall. These turned out to be invariants of IF formulas,
and so they determine some fragments of IF logic, for example:
Def 8.1. We denote as IFPR (resp. IFKM, IFAR) the fragment of regular IF
formulas with perfect recall (resp. knowledge memory, action recall) for both
players.
As we already mentioned, it was shown that, for what regards sentences
and the notions of truth equivalence and falsity equivalence, IFPR has the same
expressive power as first-order logic:
Theorem 8.2 (Sevenster,[11]). Every IFPR sentence ϕ is truth equivalent (resp.
falsity equivalent) with a first-order sentence.
We show here that this result can be extended to the larger fragment IFKM.
That is, lack of knowledge memory turns out to be essential in order to obtain
greater expressive power than that of first-order logic.
Theorem 8.3. Every IFKM sentence ϕ is truth equivalent (resp. falsity equiv-
alent) with a first-order sentence.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ IFKM. Without loss of generality, we may suppose ϕ to be
in negation normal form, since the transformations needed for translating a
formula into negation normal form preserve knowledge memory. While dealing
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with truth equivalence, we can also assume that the slash sets of universal
quantifiers of ϕ are empty.
Suppose first that ϕ ∈ IFAR; then ϕ ∈ IFPR, and the claim holds thanks to
Sevenster’s theorem.
Suppose instead ϕ /∈ IFAR. Let (∃x/X) and (∃y/Y ) be quantifications occurring
in ϕ that are witness of the failure of action recall (i.e., (∃x/X) ≺ (∃y/Y )
and x ∈ Y ) and such that (∃y/Y ) occurs with maximal depth in ϕ. Since
ϕ ∈ IFKM, it cannot contain any broken signalling sequence, in particular no
broken signalling sequence ending in (∃x/X), (∃y/Y ). So, by Theorem 7.7 ϕ is
truth equivalent to ϕy←x (here we used the fact that ϕ is in negation normal
form). And ϕy←x ∈ IFKM, thanks to the maximal depth of the occurrence
of (∃y/Y ) (suppose there is (∃z/Z) ≻ (∃y/(Y \ {x}) such that x ∈ Z; then,
the couple (∃x/X), (∃z/Z) is a witness of the failure of action recall in ϕ, and
(∃z/Z) occurs in ϕ with greater depth than (∃y/Y ) ). So, we can iterate this
elimination process until we remove all witnesses of failure of action recall, and
obtain a formula ϕ0 ∈ IFPR which is truth equivalent to ϕ. But ϕ0 is truth
equivalent to some first-order formula due to Sevenster’s theorem.
The case of falsity equivalence is proved using the dual of Theorem 7.7.
9 Final remarks
We have given a characterization of the behaviour of existential declarations of
independence in IF quantifier prefixes; we extended the result also to the more
general framework of equilibrium semantics. We have formally proved that the
I∃∃ are relevant precisely when they interrupt some flow of information from a
universal quantification to an existential quantification (a flow which does not
explicitly ”leak” information - this is condition 4 in the definition of ”broken
signalling sequence”). The characterization is syntactical and thus effective.
Dual results can be derived for I∀∀ declarations of independence.
Due to its effectiveness, the main theorem can be seen as a schema of equiv-
alence rules
ϕ
ϕy←x
(provided that independence of y from x is irrelevant)
and thus may be seen as a small contribution to the understanding of the proof
theory of IF logic. As a corollary, we obtained a game-theoretical proof of the
fact that declarations of independence are meaningless in existential sentences,
i.e., existential sentences are essentially first-order. Similar results were drawn
for more general classes of IF sentences.
Through a mild generalization of the main theorem, we managed to prove
that the knowledge memory fragment of IF logic has essentially first-order ex-
pressive power, thus strenghtening a previous result of Sevenster on the perfect
recall fragment.
As a last observation, we repeat that our notion of relevance is weak: it
manifests itself as existence of both a model and a sentence on which truth is
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influenced by removal of a declaration of independence. What happens if we fix
a model and look at which sentences’ truth values are influenced by removal of
declarations of independence? Corollary 4.4 provides an answer. We wonder,
instead, what happens if we fix a formula and look at its possible models; it is
our opinion that the problem is difficult to address, due to the complexity of
signalling phenomena. Also, we have not investigated any notion of relevance
for IF (open) formulas and their ”team semantics”.
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